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Abstract
We propose a definition for the information theoretic security of a quantum
public-key encryption scheme, and present bit-oriented and two-bit-oriented
encryption schemes satisfying our security definition via the introduction of
a new public-key algorithm structure. We extend the scheme to a multi-bit-
oriented one, and conjecture that it is also information theoretically secure,
depending directly on the structure of our new algorithm.
Keywords:
ciphertext indistinguishability, quantum public-key, information theoretic
security
1. Introduction
The public-key encryption schemes currently used will not keep their security
in the post-quantum era, so it is necessary to find new kinds of encryption
to resist the attacks of quantum adversaries. Quantum public-key encryp-
tion (QPKE) is one solution, which has been studied for about ten years.
Okamoto et al [1] put forward a knapsack-based scheme which involves a
quantum algorithm during key generation. Gottesman and Chuang [2] were
the first to use quantum states as public keys. Gottesman was also the
first to put forward ”Quantum Public Key Cryptography with Information-
Theoretic Security” [3] based on Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs. Yang [4]
has discussed public-key encryption of quantum messages based on a classi-
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cal computational complexity hypothesis. Kawachi et al [5] investigated the
cryptographic property ”computational indistinguishability” of two quantum
states generated via fully flipped permutations (QSCDff), and gave a QPKE
scheme based on this. Nikolopoulos [6] suggested another scheme based on
qubit rotations. The latter two schemes are bit-oriented, and Kawachi et al
extended their scheme to multibits [7],which was later shown in [8] to have
bounded information theoretic security.
2. Security of Quantum Public-Key Encryption
In classical public-key encryption (PKE), the ciphertext indistinguishability
under a chosen plaintext attack (CPA) is defined as [9]: for every polynomial-
size circuit family {Cn}, every positive polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large
n, and every x, y in plaintext space,the probability Pr(·) satisfies:
|Pr[Cn(G1(1n), EG1(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(G1(1n), EG1(1n)(y)) = 1]| <
1
p(n)
. (1)
As the ciphertext is a quantum state in the quantum case, the cipher-
text indistinguishability of QPKE is defined as the indistinguishability of
any two quantum states in ciphertext space. Koshiba [10] extended indistin-
guishability to QPKE, but he restricted the circuit to a polynomial-size one.
We propose here a definition of ciphertext indistinguishability of quantum
public-key encryption beyond the computational complexity hypothesis.
Definition 1. A quantum public-key encryption has ciphertext indistinguisha-
bility under CPA, if for every quantum circuit family {Cn}, for every positive
polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n, and every x, y in plaintext space,the
probability Pr(·) satisfies:
|Pr[Cn(G1(1n), EG1(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(G1(1n), EG1(1n)(y)) = 1]| <
1
p(n)
. (2)
where the encryption algorithm E is a quantum algorithm, and the ciphertexts
E(x) and E(y) are quantum states.
The difference between our definition and Koshiba’s is that there is no
restriction on {Cn} in our definition.
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According to [9](see page 476), the definition we have presented here is
related to information theoretic security under CPA. We define: A quantum
public-key encryption is information theoretically secure under CPA if it
satisfies Eq. (2).
In the following part, we give a quantum public-key encryption scheme
which satisfies our definition of information theoretic security under CPA.
3. A bit oriented Public-key Encryption Scheme
Let: Ωn = {k ∈ Z2n | WH(k) is odd} and Πn = {k ∈ Z2n | WH(k) is even},
where WH(k) is k’s Hamming weight.
Definition 2. Define two n-qubit states:
ρ0k,i =
1
2
(|i〉+ |i⊕ k〉)(〈i|+ 〈i⊕ k|), (3)
and
ρ1k,i =
1
2
(|i〉 − |i⊕ k〉)(〈i| − 〈i⊕ k|), (4)
where i ∈ Z2n,k ∈ Ωn .
The two states ρ0k,i and ρ
1
k,i can be generated effectively as follows:
For given i and k, use a permutation operator Pk on |k〉, so that Pk|k〉 =
|1 · · · 10 · · · 0〉. Let Pk|i〉 = |i′〉|i′′〉, so:
1√
2
Pk(|i〉+ |i⊕ k〉) = 1√
2
(|i′〉|i′′〉+ |i′ ⊕ (2WH(k) − 1)〉|i′′ ⊕ 0〉)
=
1√
2
(|i′〉+ |i′〉)|i′′〉, (5)
where |i′〉 is the state after applying the X operation on each qubit of |i′〉.
It can be seen that, 1√
2
(|i′〉 + |i′〉) is a WH(k) bits GHZ state. Inverting
the above process, we obtain an effective way to generate ρ0k,i if GHZ states
are available.
To produce ρ1k,i, we just apply Z on each qubit of ρ
0
k,i for WH(k) odd.
Then we have a polynomial-time quantum algorithm to convert ρ0k,i to ρ
1
k,i
without k and i.
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Figure 1: First, Bob sends his public-key (s, ρ0k,i) to a public register. Alice gets Bob’s
public-key from the public register, then she encrypts b into ρbk,i, and sends (s, ρ
b
k,i) back
to Bob.
3.1. Application in Quantum Public-Key Encryption
Our quantum public-key encryption is shown in Figure 1:
[Key Generation]
(G1) Bob selects randomly a Boolean function F : Ωn → Ωn as private key;
(G2) Bob selects s ∈ Ωn randomly;
(G3) Bob generates ρ0k,i, where k = F (s), i is chosen randomly from Z2n ;
(G4) Bob sends the classical-quantum pair (s, ρ0k,i) to a public register as his
public-key.
When Alice needs to send a classical bit b to Bob via the quantum channel,
they can do as follows:
[Encryption]
(E1) Alice gets one of Bob’s public keys from the public register;
(E2) Alice encrypts b into ρbk,i, then sends (s, ρ
b
k,i) to Bob;
[Decryption]
(D1) Bob receives (s, ρbk,i), and calculates k = F (s);
(D2) Bob decrypts the one-bit message with k: (s, ρbk,i)→ b.
Notes:
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(1) The Boolean function F can be chosen from a larger set {0, 1}poly(n),
but when s is chosen, it should satisfy F (s) ∈ Ωn.
(2) The public register should ensure that Alice obtains the correct public-
key from Bob. This is a precondition of all public-key encryption
schemes.
3.2. Trapdoor Property
Bob can decrypt the cipertext states with k, but without i. So, we consider
the mixed states: ρ0k =
1
2n
∑
i ρ
0
k,i and ρ
1
k =
1
2n
∑
i ρ
1
k,i.
Lemma 3. For given k ∈ Ωn, there exists a polynomial-time quantum algo-
rithm that distinguishes ρ0k and ρ
1
k determinedly.
Proof: Let ρ be the unknown state ρ0k or ρ
1
k, then the algorithm is given as
follows:
(1) Prepare two quantum registers, the first register holds a control bit in
|0〉〈0|, and the second one holds ρ. After Hadamard’s transformation
is applied to the first register, the state of the system becomes:
(|0〉+ |1〉)(〈0|+ 〈1|)
2
⊗ ρ. (6)
(2) Define Controlled-k operator Ck as: Ck|0〉|i〉 = |0〉|i〉, Ck|1〉|i〉 = |1〉|i⊕
k〉 for any i ∈ Z2n , (Ck can be realized via a group of CNOT operations),
apply Ck to the two registers, then the result will be
1
2n
2n−1∑
i=0
|ϕ0k,i〉〈ϕ0k,i|, if ρ = ρ0k, (7)
or
1
2n
2n−1∑
i=0
|ϕ1k,i〉〈ϕ1k,i|, if ρ = ρ1k, (8)
where
|ϕ0k,i〉 = Ck[
1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)(|i〉+ |i⊕ k〉)]
=
1
2
[|0〉(|i〉+ |i⊕ k〉) + |1〉(|i⊕ k〉+ |i〉)] , (9)
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|ϕ1k,i〉 = Ck[
1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)(|i〉 − |i⊕ k〉)]
=
1
2
[|0〉(|i〉 − |i⊕ k〉) + |1〉(|i⊕ k〉 − |i〉)] . (10)
(3) Apply Hadamard transformation to the first register again:
(H ⊗ I)|ϕ0k,i〉 =
1√
2
|0〉(|i〉+ |i⊕ k〉), (11)
(H ⊗ I)|ϕ1k,i〉 =
1√
2
|1〉(|i〉 − |i⊕ k〉). (12)
If ρ = ρ0k, the final state is |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ0k; if ρ = ρ1k, the final state is
|1〉〈1| ⊗ ρ1k.
It can be seen that we can distinguish ρ0kand ρ
1
k with correct probability
1 after measuring the first register. 
3.3. Security Proof
If there exists an eavesdropper Eve between Alice and Bob, she may use two
ways to attack the QPKE. One is to find information about k; another is to
distinguish between ρ0k,i and ρ
1
k,i to eavesdrop the message.
By measuring ρ0k,i or ρ
1
k,i, Eve can get i or i⊕k with the same probability
1/2, but she cannot get both of them. For each ρ0k,i or ρ
1
k,i, i and s are
chosen randomly, then k = F (s) is also random. Although Eve may get i⊕k
with probability 1/2, she cannot obtain any information about k because
she cannot get i at the same time. The security is the same as that of a
one-time-pad in classical cryptography.
If Eve has an effective algorithm to distinguish ρ0k,i and ρ
1
k,i with non-
negligible probability without k and i, that means Eve can distinguish the
mixed states: ρ0odd =
1
2n−1·2n
∑
k∈Ωn
∑
i ρ
0
k,i, and ρ
1
odd =
1
2n−1·2n
∑
k∈Ωn
∑
i ρ
1
k,i.
However, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4. The trace distance (defined as [11]) between ρ0odd and ρ
1
odd is
1
2n−1
.
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Proof:
ρ0odd − ρ1odd =
4
22n
∑
k∈Ωn
∑
i
|i〉〈i⊕ k| = 4
22n
Aodd, (13)
where Aodd is a matrix with
aij =
{1, WH(i) mod 2 6= WH(j) mod 2
0, WH(i) mod 2 = WH(j) mod 2
. (14)
Applying an appropriate unitary operator to both sides of Aodd, we obtain
A′ =


0 1 · · · 0 1
1 0 · · · 1 0
· · ·
0 1 · · · 0 1
1 0 · · · 1 0

 =
[
1 1
1 1
]⊗(n−1)
⊗
[
0 1
1 0
]
. (15)
For |A⊗ B| = |A| ⊗ |B| and tr(A⊗ B) = tr(A)× tr(B), we have:
tr|Aodd| = tr|A′| = tr
∣∣∣∣
[
1 1
1 1
]∣∣∣∣
(n−1)
× tr
∣∣∣∣
[
0 1
1 0
]∣∣∣∣ = 2n, (16)
D(ρ0odd, ρ
1
odd) =
1
2
tr
∣∣∣∣ 422nAodd
∣∣∣∣ = 42 · 22n · 2n =
1
2n−1
. (17)

Theorem 5. The quantum public-key encryption given above satisfies the
inequality (2), so it has information theoretic security under CPA.
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Proof: For every quantum circuit family {Cn}, and every x, y ∈ {0, 1},
Pr[Cn(G1(1
n), EG1(1n)(x)) = 1] = Pr
k,i
[Cn(ρ
x
k,i) = 1]
=
∑
k,i
pk,i · Pr[Cn(ρxk,i) = 1]
=
1
22n−1
∑
k,i
Pr[Cn(ρ
x
k,i) = 1]
= Pr[Cn(
1
22n−1
∑
k,i
ρxk,i) = 1]
= Pr[Cn(ρ
x
odd) = 1]. (18)
If x and y are different, we consider the difference between ρ0odd and ρ
1
odd.
Any quantum circuit family {Cn} that distinguishes between quantum
states ρ0odd and ρ
1
odd can be regarded as distinguishing two probability distri-
butions {pm} and {qm} based on a positive operator-valued measure(POVM)
{Em} [12, 13], where pm = tr(Cn(ρ0odd)Em) and qm = tr(Cn(ρ1odd)Em) are the
probability distributions of quantum measurement outcomes labeled by m.
The maximum trace distance between {pm} and {qm} [11] over the whole set
of POVMs determines the probability upper bound for distinguishing ρ0odd
and ρ1odd by {Cn},
|Pr[Cn(ρ0odd) = 1]− Pr[Cn(ρ1odd) = 1]|
≤ max
{Em}
1
2
∑
m
|tr[Em(Cn(ρ0odd)− Cn(ρ1odd))]|
= max
{Em}
D(pm, qm). (19)
According to [11, 14],
max
{Em}
D(pm, qm) = D(Cn(ρ
0
odd), Cn(ρ
1
odd)) ≤ D(ρ0odd, ρ1odd) =
1
2n−1
. (20)
For any positive polynomial p(·), there exists a sufficiently large n so that
Eq. (2) is satisfied. 
Remark. Like the public-key encryption mentioned above, in [5, 7], the
private-key pi and public-key ρ+pi have a one-to-one correspondence, so the
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public-key ρ+pi can only be used t times, t = o(nlogn) [8]. Because pi contains
O(nlogn)-bits, its efficiency is no better than a one-time pad. In our scheme,
the private-key F is about poly(n)-bits long, and it corresponds to a group of
public-keys (s, ρ0i,k), where s and i are chosen randomly. As mentioned above,
s is open but k = F (s) is hidden by the one-time key i, so the adversary
cannot compute F . Our private-key can be reused 2O(n) times.
If we change our scheme to one similar to that in [5], letting k be the
private-key, ρ0k the public-key, then using the method in Theorems 2.4 and
3.1 of [8], we can obtain following result:
Theorem 6. If we fix the key pair at (ρ0k, k), the key pair can only be used
t times, t=o(n).
Proof: We calculate ‖ 1
2n−1
∑
k (ρ
0
k − ρ1k)⊗ (ρ0k)⊗t)‖tr. For simplicity, we cal-
culate ‖ 1
2n−1
∑
k ρ
0
k ⊗ (ρ0k)⊗t − ( I2n )⊗t+1‖tr and use the triangle inequality.
ρ0k =
1
2 · 2n
∑
i
2(|i〉〈i|+ |i〉〈i⊕ k|) = 1
2n
∑
i
∑
x
|i〉(〈i⊕ xk|), (21)
where x ∈ {0, 1}. Thus we have
‖ 1
2n−1
∑
k
(
(ρ0k)
⊗t − ( I
2n
)⊗t
)
‖tr
=
1
2n−1 · 2nt‖
∑
k
∑
i1,··· ,it
∑
x1,··· ,xt
(|i1, · · · , it〉〈i1 ⊕ x1k, · · · , it ⊕ xtk|−
−|i1, · · · , it〉〈i1, · · · , it|) ‖tr
=
1
2n−1 · 2nt‖
∑
k
∑
i1,··· ,it
∑
x1,··· ,xt
(x1,··· ,xt) 6=(0,··· ,0)
|i1, · · · , it〉〈i1 ⊕ x1k, · · · , it ⊕ xtk|‖tr
≤ 1
2n−1 · 2nt
∑
i1,··· ,it
‖|i1, · · · , it〉‖ · ‖
∑
k
∑
x1,··· ,xt
(x1,··· ,xt) 6=(0,··· ,0)
〈i1 ⊕ x1k, · · · , it ⊕ xtk|‖
=
1
2n−1 · 2nt · 2
nt ·
√
2n−1(2t − 1)
<
√
1
2n−t
. (22)
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If we want ‖ 1
2n−1
∑
k (ρ
0
k − ρ1k)⊗ (ρ0k)⊗t)‖tr < 1/p(n), t should be o(n). 
Our QPKE is information theoretic security, which is realized via a new
public-key algorithm structure. The security of the scheme in [8] is bounded
information theoretic secure because it is based on a common public-key
structure.
4. Extended QPKE for Multibits
We take a two-bit scheme as an example to show how to extend our QPKE
to encrypt more than one bit with each pair of the public-key.
4.1. Four States Used to Construct the Public-Key
Definition 7. Define the n-qubit state as:
|Ψ00k1,k2,i〉 =
1
2
(|i〉+ |i⊕ k1〉+ |i⊕ k2〉+ |i⊕ k1 ⊕ k2〉)
=
1
2
(|i1〉|i2〉+ |i1 ⊕ k11〉|i2 ⊕ k12〉+ |i1 ⊕ k21〉|i2 ⊕ k22〉
+ |i1 ⊕ k11 ⊕ k21〉|i2 ⊕ k12 ⊕ k22〉), (23)
where k1, k2, i ∈ Z2n, i1, i2 ∈ Z2n2 , k11, k22 ∈ Ω2n2 , k12, k21 ∈ Π2n2 , and i =
(i1, i2), k1 = (k11, k12), k2 = (k21, k22).
Applying I⊗
n
2 ⊗ Z⊗n2 on |Ψ00k1,k2,i〉, we obtain:
|Ψ01k1,k2,i〉 =
1
2
(|i〉+ |i⊕ k1〉 − |i⊕ k2〉 − |i⊕ k1 ⊕ k2〉). (24)
Applying Z⊗
n
2 ⊗ I⊗n2 on |Ψ00k1,k2,i〉, we obtain:
|Ψ10k1,k2,i〉 =
1
2
(|i〉 − |i⊕ k1〉+ |i⊕ k2〉 − |i⊕ k1 ⊕ k2〉). (25)
Applying Z⊗n on |Ψ00k1,k2,i〉, we obtain:
|Ψ11k1,k2,i〉 =
1
2
(|i〉 − |i⊕ k1〉 − |i⊕ k2〉+ |i⊕ k1 ⊕ k2〉). (26)
Let the four states be the cipher text of two classical bits. We construct
a two-bit oriented QPKE scheme based on them.
10
4.2. Trapdoor Property
Suppose k1 and k2 are given, for which without i the four mixed states are:
ρ00k1,k2 =
1
2n
∑
i
|Ψ00k1,k2,i〉〈Ψ00k1,k2,i|, (27)
ρ01k1,k2 =
1
2n
∑
i
|Ψ01k1,k2,i〉〈Ψ01k1,k2,i|, (28)
ρ10k1,k2 =
1
2n
∑
i
|Ψ10k1,k2,i〉〈Ψ10k1,k2,i|, (29)
ρ11k1,k2 =
1
2n
∑
i
|Ψ11k1,k2,i〉〈Ψ11k1,k2,i|. (30)
We take ρ10k1,k2 as an example to explain that the algorithm described
in Lemma 3 can also be used to distinguish these four states. The process
includes the following steps:
(1) Prepare two quantum registers, the first one contains two control bits
in state |0〉〈0|⊗ |0〉〈0|, and the second one contains the unknown state.
Take ρ10k1,k2 as an example, then the state of the system is
|0〉〈0| ⊗ |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ10k1,k2. (31)
(2) Apply the Hadamard transformation to the first control bit and the
controlled-k1 operator to ρ
10
k1,k2
, then the state of the system becomes
1
2n
∑
i
|ϕ10k1,k2,i〉〈ϕ10k1,k2,i|, (32)
where
|ϕ10k1,k2,i〉 =
1
2
√
2
[|0〉|0〉(|i〉 − |i⊕ k1〉+ |i⊕ k2〉 − |i⊕ k1 ⊕ k2〉)
+|1〉|0〉(|i⊕ k1〉 − |i〉 − |i⊕ k1 ⊕ k2〉+ |i⊕ k2〉)].(33)
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(3) Apply the Hadamard transformation to the first control bit again, and
the state of the system becomes
|1〉〈1| ⊗ |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ10k1,k2. (34)
(4) It can be seen that if we perform operations H ⊗ I ·Ck2 ·H ⊗ I that is
related to the second control bit, the final state of the system will be
|1〉〈1| ⊗ |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ10k1,k2. (35)
If the unknown state is one of the other three, the final state will be:
|0〉〈0| ⊗ |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ00k1,k2, (36)
or
|0〉〈0| ⊗ |1〉〈1| ⊗ ρ01k1,k2, (37)
or
|1〉〈1| ⊗ |1〉〈1| ⊗ ρ11k1,k2. (38)
We can distinguish between these four states by measuring the first reg-
ister.
4.3. Indistinguishability Property
Without k1, k2 and i, the ciphertext consists of four mixed states:
ρ00odd =
1
22n−4
∑
k1,k2
ρ00k1,k2,i, (39)
ρ01odd =
1
22n−4
∑
k1,k2
ρ01k1,k2,i, (40)
ρ10odd =
1
22n−4
∑
k1,k2
ρ10k1,k2,i, (41)
ρ11odd =
1
22n−4
∑
k1,k2
ρ11k1,k2,i, (42)
where k1 and k2 satisfy definition 7.
We can prove that the trace distance between any two of the four states
is O( 1
2n
).
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(1) The trace distance between ρ00odd and ρ
11
odd is D(ρ
00
odd, ρ
11
odd) =
1
2n−2
(see
Appendix A).
(2) The trace distance between ρ00odd and ρ
01
odd is D(ρ
00
odd, ρ
01
odd) =
1
2n−2
(see
Appendix B).
(3) The trace distance between ρ00odd and ρ
10
odd is D(ρ
00
odd, ρ
10
odd) =
1
2n−2
. The
proof is similar as that of D(ρ00odd, ρ
01
odd).
(4) By the triangle inequality of the trace distance [11], we have
D(ρ10odd, ρ
01
odd) ≤ D(ρ00odd, ρ10odd) +D(ρ00odd, ρ01odd) =
1
2n−3
, (43)
D(ρ10odd, ρ
11
odd) ≤ D(ρ00odd, ρ10odd) +D(ρ00odd, ρ11odd) =
1
2n−3
, (44)
D(ρ01odd, ρ
11
odd) ≤ D(ρ00odd, ρ01odd) +D(ρ00odd, ρ11odd) =
1
2n−3
. (45)
As shown in Figure 2, each trace distance between any two of these four
states is O( 1
2n
).
Figure 2: Trace distances between ρ00odd and other three states are
1
2n−2
, so the trace
distances between any two states of the other three are no more than 1
2n−3
.
4.4. Extended QPKE for Two Bits
To extend the QPKE scheme to the two-bit oriented one, two aspects will be
modified:
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(1) Bob chooses s ∈ {0, 1}poly(n) randomly, satisfies F (s) = (k1, k2), where
k1, k2 are defined above. Bob generates the n-qubit state ρ
00
k1,k2,i
, and
sends (s, ρ00k1,k2,i) to the public register as his public-key.
(2) Alice encrypts 00 into ρ00k1,k2,i, 01 into ρ
01
k1,k2,i
, 10 into ρ10k1,k2,i and 11
into ρ11k1,k2,i, with operations I
⊗n, I⊗
n
2 ⊗ Z⊗n2 , Z⊗n2 ⊗ I⊗n2 and Z⊗n
respectively.
Because the trace distance of every pair of the four states is O( 1
2n
), the
QPKE scheme satisfies Eq.(2), so it is a scheme with information theoretic
security under CPA.
4.5. Extended QPKE for Multi Bits
We now extend the QPKE to encrypt l bits. Define n-qubit state as:
|Ψ00···0k1,k2,··· ,kl,i〉 =
1√
2l
∑
x1,··· ,xl
|i⊕ x1k1 ⊕ x2k2 · · · ⊕ xlkl〉. (46)
where k1, k2, · · · , kl, i ∈ Z2n , x1, · · · , xl ∈ {0, 1}, each kj (j = 1, · · · , l) can
be divided into l parts kj = (kj1, · · · , kjl), only WH(kjj) = odd, and others
are even.
We can use
l⊗
j=1
((1− xj)I + xjZ)⊗nl |Ψ00···0k1,k2,··· ,kl,i〉, (47)
to represent classical bits (x1, · · · , xl). If we use these 2l states to construct
QPKE, the algorithm introduced in Lemma 3 can also be used for decryption.
We conjecture that the trace distance of every pair of these mixed states is
O( 1
2n−l
), then the extended scheme is also one with information theoretic
security under CPA.
5. Conclusions
We have proposed a definition for the information theoretic security of a
quantum public-key encryption scheme, and proved the sufficient condition
that a QPKC scheme has information theoretic security if the trace distance
between every pair of ciphertext states is less than 1/p(n) for every posi-
tive polynomial p(·). We present bit-oriented and two-bit-oriented QPKE
schemes with a new algorithm structure, and prove that both of them sat-
isfy our security definition. Finally, we extend the QPKE to the multi-bit-
oriented case, and conjecture that the scheme is also one with information
14
theoretic security. The information theoretic security of our QPKE schemes
depends directly on the new structure of the public-key algorithm that we
have introduced here.
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Appendix A.
Trace Distance between ρ00odd and ρ
11
odd:
ρ00odd − ρ11odd =
2
22n−4 · 2n · 4
∑
k1,k2,i
(Ei,i⊕k1 + Ei,i⊕k2 + Ei⊕k1,i + Ei⊕k1,i⊕k1⊕k2
+ Ei⊕k2,i + Ei⊕k2,i⊕k1⊕k2 + Ei⊕k1⊕k2,i⊕k1 + Ei⊕k1⊕k2,i⊕k2), (A.1)
since ∑
i
Ei,i⊕k1 =
∑
i
Ei⊕k1,i =
∑
i
Ei⊕k2,i⊕k1⊕k2 =
∑
i
Ei⊕k1⊕k2,i⊕k2,(A.2)
and ∑
i
Ei,i⊕k2 =
∑
i
Ei⊕k1,i⊕k1⊕k2 =
∑
i
Ei⊕k2,i =
∑
i
Ei⊕k1⊕k2,i⊕k1,(A.3)
then
ρ00odd − ρ11odd =
8
22n−4 · 2n · 4
∑
k1,k2,i
(Ei,i⊕k1 + Ei,i⊕k2)
=
8 · 2n−2
22n−4 · 2n · 4
∑
i
(
∑
k1
Ei,i⊕k1 +
∑
k2
Ei,i⊕k2)
=
1
2n−3 · 2n
∑
i
∑
j∈Ωn
Ei,i⊕j
=
1
2n−3 · 2nAodd. (A.4)
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where the Aodd is the same as in (14), according to (16) we have
D(ρ00odd, ρ
11
odd) =
1
2
tr|ρ00odd − ρ11odd| =
1
2n−2 · 2n tr|Aodd| =
1
2n−2
. (A.5)
Appendix B.
Trace Distance between ρ00odd and ρ
01
odd:
ρ00odd − ρ01odd =
2
22n−4 · 2n · 4
∑
k1,k2,i
(Ei,i⊕k2 + Ei,i⊕k1⊕k2 + Ei⊕k1,i⊕k2 +
+ Ei⊕k1,i⊕k1⊕k2 + Ei⊕k2,i + Ei⊕k2,i⊕k1 + Ei⊕k1⊕k2,i + Ei⊕k1⊕k2,i⊕k1), (B.1)
since
∑
i
Ei,i⊕k2 =
∑
i
Ei⊕k1,i⊕k1⊕k2 =
∑
i
Ei⊕k2,i =
∑
i
Ei⊕k1⊕k2,i⊕k1,(B.2)
and
∑
i
Ei,i⊕k1⊕k2 =
∑
i
Ei⊕k1,i⊕k2 =
∑
i
Ei⊕k2,i⊕k1 =
∑
i
Ei⊕k1⊕k2,i,(B.3)
then
ρ00odd − ρ01odd
=
8
22n−4 · 2n · 4
∑
k1,k2,i
(Ei,i⊕k2 + Ei,i⊕k1⊕k2) (B.4)
=
8
23n−2
∑
k11,k12,k21,
k22,i1,i2
(Ei1,i1⊕k21 ⊗ Ei2,i2⊕k22 + Ei1,i1⊕k11⊕k21 ⊗ Ei2,i2⊕k12⊕k22).
Since WH(k11) = odd, WH(k12) = even, WH(k21) = even and WH(k22) =
odd, we have ∑
k11
Ei1,i1⊕k11⊕k21 =
∑
k11
Ei1,i1⊕k11 , (B.5)
∑
k22
Ei2,i2⊕k12⊕k22 =
∑
k22
Ei2,i2⊕k22 . (B.6)
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then
ρ00odd − ρ01odd =
8 · 2n−2
23n−2
∑
i1,i2
(
∑
k21,k22
Ei1,i1⊕k21 ⊗Ei2,i2⊕k22 +
∑
k11,k22
Ei1,i1⊕k11 ⊗ Ei2,i2⊕k22)
=
1
22n−3
(
∑
i1,k21
Ei1,i1⊕k21 +
∑
i1,k11
Ei1,i1⊕k11)⊗ (
∑
i2,k22
Ei2,i2⊕k22)
=
1
22n−3
An
2
⊗Aodd,n
2
, (B.7)
where Aodd,n
2
is a 2
n
2 × 2n2 matrix similar to Aodd, and
An
2
=
[
1 1
1 1
]⊗n
2
,
then we have
tr|An
2
| = 2n2 ,
tr|Aodd,n
2
| = 2n2 ,
D(ρ00odd, ρ
01
odd) =
1
2
tr|ρ00odd − ρ01odd| =
1
22n−2
tr|An
2
| × tr|Aodd,n
2
| = 1
2n−2
.
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